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In this paper we analyze the conditions under which increasing technical efficiency of water use in the agricultural 
sector might not reduce water demand and pressures on water ecosystems. Departing from this basic problem we 
discuss how policy measures performed to enhance water productivity in the agriculture might be transformed into 
effective alternatives to improve the conservation of water resources and then guarantee the successful 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive. A preference revelation model is presented in the third section of 
the paper and one empirical application to an irrigation district in southern Spain is used in the fourth section to discuss 
the effectiveness of water savings measures.  
  
Key words:  Water Framework Directive, Water Economics, Agricultural Economics, 
Simulation Models, Preference Revelation. 
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Agriculture and Water Policy in the Context of the Water Framework 
Directive 
 
1.  Water Efficiency vs. Water Policy: The problem 
 
In  the  agricultural  sector,  particularly  in  European  Mediterranean  countries,  pressure  over  water 
resources is above what is needed to obtain a good status of the water ecosystem, and also to guarantee 
water supply in adequate quality and quantity in the recurrent dry periods and even in future (Olsen, 
2008). This is already recognised by national authorities since Hydrological Plans (e.g. Ministerio de 
Medio Ambiente, 2008) establish that a reduction in water withdrawals in all southern Mediterranean 
river basins is needed to guarantee future sustainability of water extractions. Water saving measures in 
irrigated agriculture such as improvements in distribution channels and the substitution of traditional 
irrigation  techniques  may  have  quantitatively  important  effects  on  water  demand  for  the  whole 
economy
1. Efficiency measures are usually considered to be effective ways to obtain the same level of 
water services with lower water withdrawals and a better ecological quality of the water sources
2. 
However, the implicit assumption that water savings from efficiency measures implementation will 
automatically translate into a reduction in water extractions is not necessarily true since the effect on 
water withdrawals will depend on how the economic  agents react. In fact enhancing efficiency is 
equivalent to increasing water productivity and then the demand of water as a production input. The 
common wisdom according to which improving water efficiency is all we need to increase the amount 
of water left in nature may be as wrong as concluding that a higher labour productivity is a way to 
increase unemployment in the economy
3. 
 
The following graphical example shows how in fact efficiency measures might increase water demand 
in agriculture. An irrigation technique can be properly defined by the relationship between the quantity 
of water used in a plot (applied water) and the quantity of the water effectively used by the crops 
(effective water)
4: Typical irrigation efficiency of gravitation methods is about   0.5 but drip and 
sprinkler irrigation may increase irrigation efficiency up to 90% (Hanemann et. al. 1987). An increase 
in irrigation efficiency is not only a way to reduce the minimum water that needs to be applied in order 
to satisfy a certain level of water effectively used by crops. It is also a way to reduce the marginal cost 
of producing effective water with a given quantity of raw water. The final effect of a higher efficiency 
over water demand is then unclear as the quantity and the price effects may go in opposite directions. 
The  answer  will  depend  first  on  price  elasticity  of  demand,  which  depends  on  the  marginal 
productivity of effective water, and second, on how the setting of a more efficient irrigation technique 
affects the marginal cost of us ing water by, for example, increasing the need of energy and labour 
required for water delivery. 
 
In what follows we present a graphical example with two assumptions: a decreasing marginal 
productivity of effective water and a marginal cost of applying wat er that does not increase with the 
irrigation technical shift. This is all that is needed to show that contrary to common wisdom a higher 
efficiency in the way water is used for irrigation  might increase pressures on the water ecosystems . 
                                                 
1  For  example,  the  Spanish  Plan  for  the  Modernization  of  Irrigated  Agriculture  (Plan  de  Choque  de 
Modernización  de  Regadíos  (Real  Decreto  287/2006))  includes  the  expenditure  of  2,049  million  euros  and 
expect to save 1.162 millions of cubic meters equivalent to 5% of the overall water used in the Spanish economy. 
The plan only includes a variety of water efficiency measures but water tariffs and property rights management 
are not included in the set of water saving measures. 
2 A reduction in water withdrawals increases the stock of water in the water source and therefore helps to reduce 
salt and the concentration of other contaminants and nutrients 
3 The possibility that efficiency improvements in the use of natural resources could not result in the expected 
reduction in resource use is known as the Jevons’s paradox or rebound effect (see Alcott, 2005). For an 
application in the context of the WFD see Tirado, et. al. (2006) 
4 See Lynne et. al. 1987 and Carlson, et. al. 1993. 3 
 
Provided no additional measures are taken water efficiency programs might then miss the target of 
protecting and improving the ecological status of water sources. 
 
 
Figure 1 Efficiency Improvements and Water Demand 
 
The irrigation technique is represented both in panels (b) and (d) in the Figure 1. In (d) irrigation 
technique is shown as a technical ratio between applied water and the amount of water actually used 
by plants. In (b) irrigation technique is shown as the relation between the water price of used water, 
that includes the market price of used water and the marginal cost of putting it into the irrigation 
system (in the vertical axis) and the marginal cost of the water effectively used (in the horizontal axis). 
As shown in the Figure the shift towards a better irrigation technique simultaneously increases the 
proportion between applied and effective water and reduces the marginal cost of the water effectively 
used by crops.  The marginal productivity of effective water is represented as a decreasing function in 
panel  (c)  and  this  function  does  not  depend  on  the  irrigation  technique.  An  improvement  in  the 
irrigation  technique  will  increase the  productivity  of  the irrigation  system  by  increasing  the  ratio 
between effective and used water and by reducing the marginal cost of effective water. The derived 
demand  of  water  for  irrigation  as  shown  in  the  figure  will  shift  outwards  with  any  technical 
improvement in irrigation. 
 
In order to show the problem, an initial situation is represented in the diagram by using the upper case 
A in the four panels of the diagram. In this case, the farmer pays a price of ten cents for 2,000 cubic 
meters that, given the inefficient irrigation technique, are transformed into 1,000 cubic meters used by 
crops implying a marginal cost of 20 cents per cubic meter of effective water. If after the irrigation 
technique substitution the price of water remains constant, the quantity of water demanded will be 
higher resulting in an increase in water extractions. This is shown in the diagram by using the upper 
case B in the four panels. We might also consider a situation in which the quantity of water use 
property rights is fixed. This situation is shown in the diagram with the upper case C in the four 
panels. In this case enhancing the efficiency in water for irrigation will result in a higher marginal 
willingness to pay for the existing water rights and, apart from the incentive to engage in illegal 
extractions, this result shows that if no action is taken over water prices or quantities, all water saved 
will be used to increase market production and the ecological quality of water bodies will not improve. 
 
Implementing the water framework directive means asking for policy packages and not for single 
water saving actions. The previous example implies that some other measures need to be implemented 




































measures required to transform a water efficiency program into a water policy instrument are of two 
kinds, those aimed at reducing water supply (by taking some water use permits out of the market) and 
those  aimed  at  increasing  the  water  price  (by  setting  it  above  the  financial  supply  cost  and 
incorporating the environmental or scarcity value of water). 
 
All that is needed in our example is a decreasing marginal productivity of effective water and  a 
marginal cost of transforming applied into effective water which does not change when the irrigation 
technique. The stylized example presented does not show many of the complexities of the problem in 
real situations. If water demand is inelastic to price (and then to reductions in the marginal cost of 
producing  effective  water)  then  water  demand  will  not  increase  with  irrigation  efficiency 
improvements. On the other hand, if a more efficient irrigation technique implies the use of energy or 
additional labour to produce effective water, as might be  the case, the positive effect over water 
demand  might  be  compensated  by  the  implicit  price  increase.  The  effect  of  water  efficiency 
improvements  on  water  demand  also  depends  on  how  flexible  farmers  are  to  adapt  to  the  new 
situation. In many cases crop surface is limited by  CAP constraints and decisions over permanent 
crops have a higher opportunity cost  than that over temporary crops. The evidence of opposite effects 
does not allow us to extract a clear conclusion over the effectiveness of the so called “water saving 
measures” as a means to reduce water use and water demand. What the example clarifies is that the 
proper knowledge of water demand for irrigation and of the cost structure of irrigation systems is a 
critical  requirement  to  assess  any  water  policy  package.  The  real  effect  of  water  saving  and  the 
ancillary measures required to reduce water extractions will differ from case to case and the design of 
optimal  policy  packages  will  become  an  empirical  question.  In  the  next  section  we  present  a 
simulation model to determine both the water demand (for applied water) and the marginal water 
productivity (for applied water). These results will allow us to discuss the design of effective policy 
packages in the context of the Water Framework Directive in a case study of southern Spain. 
 
Farmers’  decisions  depend  on  many  technical,  economical,  policy  and  environmental 
constraints. Additionally in the case of water demand these constraints vary with place to 
place  according  to  land  vocation,  access  to  water  rights,  water  tariffs  and  availability  of 
irrigation  infrastructure  in  such  a  way  that  large  scale  or  aggregated  model  might  be 
uninformative about  the driving forces  behind  water demand. Nevertheless local  and low 
scale model required detailed information and their results might not be easy to generalize or 
aggregate. The need to represent complex decision problems with limited information have 
extended  the  use  of  Positive  Mathematical  Programming  (PMP)  to  simulate  farmers 
behaviour and to obtain water demands of which many are reported, for example, in  De 
Frahan et al (2007) and Heckelei and Britz (2005). The general idea of PMP consist, first, in 
using  information  contained  in  dual  variables  of  the  calibration  constraints  to  bound  the 
solution of the linear profit maximizing problem to the observed activity levels
5. Once these 
dual variables are identified, they are used to specify a nonlinear objective function such as 
the production cost and guaranteeing that the marginal cost of the activities are equal to its 
price in the observed activity levels. This  way guarantees that both the profit maximization 
and the cost minimization problems give simultaneously to an optimal solution which exactly 
matches the baseline activity levels (see Howitt, 1995, and Paris and Howitt, 1998)
6.  
 
PMP procedures guarantees full calibration and offer other advantages over previous results. 
The nonlinear cost guarantees smooth simulation results avoiding overspecialisation and 
                                                 
5 This linear model consist in maximizing the profit associated to a vector of activity levels (x, represented by 
surfaces dedicated to a set of crops) with prices and unitary costs considered as constant an subject to a set of 
resource constraints. 
6 The dual variables,  obtained in the first stage and used to built the nonlinear objective function in the second, 
are assumed to capture any type of aggregation or model specification bias, any kind of risk attitude or price 
expectation as well as any lack of data or data measurement error (see Howit, 1995 and Heckelei and Britz, 
2005).  5 
 
corner solutions that are traditional in linear models built with a small number of activities 
and  with  numerous  resources,  technical  economic  and  policy  constraints.  Moreover  these 
models might be criticised by the way they deal with the parameter specification problem. 
There  is  an  infinite  set  of  parameters  and  functions  able  to  lead  the  model  to  a  perfect 
calibration and each set of parameters and functions leads to a different response behaviour to 
changing economic prices and policy constraints.  
 
So far the construction of water demand simulation models is confronted with a trade off 
between the model capability to provide numerical results for policy evaluation and coherence 
with basic economic principles. Apart from PMP, most of the existing simulation models that 
have  been  successfully  incorporated  as  tools  for  policy  evaluation  in  many  advanced 
countries
7  are based on multi -criteria decision methods (MCDM) (Romero and Rehman 
(1984); Romero et al. (1987); Berbel (1989); Berbel et al. (1991); Rehman and Romero 
(1993); Sumpsi et al. (1993); Berbel and Rodríguez-Ocaña (1998); Berbel and Gómez-Limón 
(2000), Gómez-Limón and Riesgo (2004)). In order to obtain relevant policy results, they 
assume that farmers’ preferences can be represented by a weighted sum of different criteria, 
such  as  expected  profits,  risk  and  sometimes  management  issues.  The  algorithm  used  to 
calibrate the weights of the attributes in the linear utility function (following Romero and 
Rehman, 1984) has proved is effectiveness to reproduce the baseline decision. Moreover, the 
assumption that farmers respond with linear preferences to changes in the policy, resource and 
economic environment and, similar to PMP, the use of a calibration mechanism effective but 
not rooted in explicit economic principles- are nevertheless prone to discussion. 
 
To find models using a preference representation coherent with basic economic principles we 
need  to  go  back  two  or  three  decades  to  Rausser  and  Yassour  (1981)  and  Delforce  and 
Hardaker (1985). These applied models of farmers’ decisions try to provide a clearer intuition 
of the logic behind farmers’ decisions using standard economic analysis by using a multi-
attribute utility function. Moreover the difficulties of running proper elicitation procedures 
with detailed data and the programming and optimization tools available at this time made 
these  exercises  difficult  to  apply  in  the  detail  needed  to  make  them  useful  for  policy 
assessment and project analysis
8. 
 
One useful insight of MCDM with respect to PMP methods is the extensive demonstration on 
how farmers do not simply act as profit maximizing agents and  on how taking other decision 
attributes such as risk aversion and avoidance of management complexities into account 
provides a better explanation of current decisions. Some versions of MCDM have been 
developed to include risk avoidance explicitly, as in th e “target MOTAD” (Minimization of 
Total Absolute Deviation), developed by Tauer (1983) and MOTAD (see Watts et al, 1984 for 
a comparison). Others include a risk premium in the discount factor (e.g. López Baldovín et 
al,  2005) or provide an evaluation  of farmers’  attitudes  towards risk by  using alternative 
utility functional forms (e.g. Torkamani and Haji-Rahimi, 2001). 
 
2.  The Model 
In this paper we present a simulation methodology able to calibrate observed decisions with a 
procedure rooted in basic microeconomic theory which allow to reveal farmers’ preferences 
without assuming linear preferences (as in MCDM) or implicit costs functions which are not 
observable (as in PMP). A behaviour model obtained this way will allow us not only the 
                                                 
7 A general review of the literature can be found in Dyer et al (1992) and Hayashi (1999). 
8 The model has been programmed and implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) allowing 
the use of an extensive database for an explicit use of the preference revelation theory. 6 
 
obtention of simulation results but a clear interpretation of farmer’s responses to changing 
incentives and resource and policy environments. 
 
Farmers’ Preferences 
Farmers decide on crops surfaces but care about expected profits, risk bearing, managing 
problems and other attributes of the decisions they take. We assume that the explanation of 
any  decision,  consisting  in  a  distribution  of  the  available  land  among  the  different  crop 
options, relies on an underlying utility function formed by the many attributes farmers use to 
assess all the alternatives they have given crop prices and costs, resource availability and the 
other relevant economic, agronomic and policy constraints. According to that we may assume 
that observe decisions respond to a decision problem of the following kind: 
 
        
 
                                    (1) 
s.t.:               
∑   
 
   
    
         
Where        is the decision profile or the crop portfolio showing one way to distribute the 
land among crops and each    measures the share of land devoted to the crop i. The set of n 
crop includes a reservation option (xn) consisting in devoting a share xn of the land to rain fed 
agriculture. From the farmer’s perspective any particular crop may be considered as an asset 
with a known present cost and an uncertain value in the future (as crop yields and prices are 
not known in advance).  As the available land is taken as given, this investment may be 
represented as a percentage (    of the available land.  
 
 Farmers  have  preferences  over  attributes  of  the  decision  profile  (               For 
example, farmers might prefer decisions with high expected profits, highly predictable yields 
and prices and not too much managing actions apart from planting and harvesting. To accept 
taking high risk options risk adverse farmers will ask for compensation, for example, with 
higher  expected  profits,  and  the  same  can  be  said  about  the  willingness  to  accept  crop 
decisions with more roundaboutness and demand for management skills. 
Finally  F(x)  represents  the space of feasible decision profiles,  given the resource, policy, 
economic and balance constraints.  
Let us assume that we have an observed decision profile and we know the whole set of 
constraints  defining  the  feasible  decision  set.  Assume  also  that  we  can  measure  a  set  of 
potentially relevant decisions attributes such as, for example, the expected profit, the variance 
of the expected profit, the hired labour demanded, the cost of inputs over the total cost and 
many other things that might be relevant in the farmers point of view. The first problem we 
need  to  deal  with  to  reveal  farmers  preferences  is  to  know  which  among  the  potentially 
relevant attributes are the relevant to explain the observed decision. Our method to answer 
these question consist in saying that the relevant set of attributes is the one to which the 
observed decision is closest to the attribute possibility frontier. In other words, if farmers care 
only about profits and risk, the observed decision attributes must be very close to the attribute 
frontier formed only by these two attributes and the same can be said about any potential set 
of attributes. In these conditions the answer to the question of which is the relevant set of 
attributes  in  explaining  farmers’  decisions  is  the  one  which  leads  the  observed  decision 
attributes the closest to the associated attribute efficiency frontier. 
The practical mathematical problem consists in looking for the attribute efficiency frontier 
starting  in  the  point  determined  by  the  observed  decision  profile.  In  real  situations  this 7 
 
efficiency frontier cannot be defined analytically with a closed mathematical function and the 
only way to represent it is by numerical methods
9. One practical solution consist in extending 
a ray from the origin, passing through the observed decision attributes and extending them as 
far as possible in the space of feasible attributes. This way we can measure the distance from 
the observed attributes to the efficiency frontier attributes. We can repeat this procedure for 
any set of potentially relevant attributes and the best candidate to reveal farmers’ preferences 
will be the one which was closest to its associated efficiency frontier. Formally the following 
problem must be solved for any member of the Power set (P(z) and for its associated observed 
attributes in the Power set (P(zo))
10 
 
   
    
    
              (     )                            (5) 
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The solution of this set of maximization problems will be an application assigning a distance 
                to each member of the power set P(z). The relevant set of attributes wil be 
the one with the lower distance to the efficiency frontier measured by the parameter        . 
In synthesis the preference eliciting problem can be presented as: 
 
   
 
        
Where:   
              [                (     )              ∑   
 
            
                    ] 
            
The solution of this problem gives us the set (   of attributes that better explains current 
farmers’  decisions.  Among  the  many  factors  that  might  be  of  relevance  in  farmers 
preferences, this set of attributes is the one which takes the observed decision closer to the 
attribute  efficiency  frontier.  If  this  calibration  procedure  takes  us  close  enough  to  the 
efficiency frontier we can obtain the implicit value of all the attributes over the efficiency 
frontier by analyzing how attributes change in the surroundings of this reference point, and 
this  information  is  all  we  need  to  integrate  a  utility  function  representing  farmers’ 
preferences
11.  
Once a farmer’s decision is shown as close as possible to the efficiency frontier, the second 
stage consists in obtaining the farmers’ preferences that explain the observed decision as a 
                                                 
9 For example, in the profit risk space any point over the efficiency frontier is defined as the minimum possible 
risk given the expected profit, or as the maximum expected profit given the risk of the decision. By solving many 
limited optimization problems we can obtain different points over the frontier but we cannot integrate them into 
a single function. 
10 A power set P(Z) is the set of all the 2
m subsets of the set Z and the power set P0(Z) is the set formed by the 2
m 
subsets of the numerical set of observed attributes.  
11 The optimal solution of   and the reference point in the efficiency frontier provide all the information to 
measure the calibration error in the atributes space. 8 
 
utility maximizing choice. Taking into account the relevant decision attributes obtained in the 
calibration stage, the multi attribute utility function is the one that is able to represent farmers’ 
preferences in such a way that the observed decision becomes the optimal choice. 
  
Using basic economic principles and knowing the efficiency frontier in the surroundings of 
the observed decision allows one to integrate such a utility function. Rational decisions imply 
that in equilibrium farmers’ marginal willingness to pay in order to improve one attribute with 
respect to any other is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of this attribute with respect to 
the  other.  In  other  words,  the  marginal  transformation  relationship  between  any  pair  of 
attributes  over  the  efficiency  frontier  is  equal  in  equilibrium  to  the  marginal  substitution 
relationship between the same pair of attributes over the indifference curve tangent to the 
observed decision. 
 
The calibration model allows us to obtain the relative opportunity cost of each of the relevant 
attributes  with  respect  to  the  others.  This  opportunity  cost  is  measured  by  the  marginal 
transformation relationship between any pair of attributes (   ). This value can be obtained 
numerically  by  solving  partial  optimization  problems  in  the  proximity  of  the  observed 
decision (as for example, searching by how much expected profits would need to be reduced 
in order to have a 1% less uncertainty or, equivalently, what is the maximum expected profit 
attainable  with  a  slightly  lower  risk  level)
12.  The  numerical  results  of  the  marginal 
relationship of transformation of any pair of attributes in a reference point over the efficiency 
frontier (   ) is the basic information to integrate the farmers’ utility function. 
Provided  farmers  act  rationally,  in  equilibrium,  the  value  (   ),  representing  the  relative 
opportunity cost of any attribute in terms of any other, is equal to the marginal substitution 
relationship between the same pair of attributes (which represents the farmers’ willingness to 
pay for marginal improvement of a given attribute in terms of any other). In other words, in 
equilibrium, decisions over crop surfaces are such that: 
              , that is to say:          
  
    ⁄
      ⁄                          
This information for the reference point over the efficiency frontier is enough to integrate a 
utility function leading to the observed decision as the optimal decision given the existing 
resource, economic, balance and policy constraints. For example, if we assume a constant 
returns of scale Cobb Douglas utility function of the kind: 
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          ∑   
 
        
 
The marginal substitution relationship among any pair of attributes is:  
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      ⁄












      
                                                 
12 The calibration procedure requires a convex efficiency frontier, meaning, for example, that decisions with 
higher expected returns are associated with higher risk levels. This hypothesis is explicitly tested in the 
calibration stage of the model by showing that the marginal transformation relationship between two positive 





   
    
Where the numerical values of the attributes  (    correspond to the  point in the efficiency 
frontier  closer  to  the  observed  decision  attributes,  the  values  of   s,  representing  the 
opportunity  cost  of  any  attribute  in  terms  of  each  other,  are  marginal  transformation 
relationships at the same point, and the only unknowns are the   parameters of the utility 
function. According to the Walras’ Law in this system the number of independent equations is 
equal to the number of attributes (condition which is guaranteed by the constant returns of the 
utility function represented in the last equation) and the system has a unique solution.  
Once this solution is obtained the model is calibrated in the sense that the optimal decision 
(         and its associated to the decision attributes (                 , is the one which 
leads the observed decision (         and the observed decision attributes (                 
closer to the efficiency frontier. Calibration errors can be measured both in the decision and in 
the attribute space, for example, a percent deviation such as: 
 












   












   
 
 
3. An empirical application: 
 
To illustrate the complexities of designing effective water policy packages in the agricultural sector we 
present  a  case  study  for  the  Sahagun  Irrigation  District  in  central  Spain.  We  take  this  case  as 
representative both of a highly EC subsidies supported agriculture and of a region where important 
efficiency gains are possible. Under the Agenda 2000 framework the almost 8,000 hectares irrigated 
use 18.51 million of cubic meters with an efficiency rate of 0.65 to obtain an expected gross benefit of 
458 €/Hectare of which CAP subsidies represent more than 50%. Water is priced at a flat rate and the 
only variable cost is the application cost of the current irrigation technique which has been estimated 
in only 1.5 eurocents per cubic meter. The example chosen is then the kind of situation where the CAP 
reform might have an important effect over water demand as a consequence of reducing or eliminating 
production  linked  subsidies  and  also  a  case  where  further  water  savings  might  be  obtained  by 
enhancing irrigation efficiency and higher water prices. 
 
Table 1 
The Sahagun Irrigation District Basic Data 
Surface  Has  7382 
Production  €/Hectare  711.87 
Direct Cost  €/Hectare  252.46 
Capital Cost  €/Hectare  173.47 
Subsidies  €/Hectare  241.05 
Expected Gross Margin  €/Hectare  458.81 
Expected Variable Margin  €/Hectare  270.61 
Water Applied  Million m
3  18.51 
Effective water  Million m
3  12.03 
Water Application Cost  €/m
3  0.015 






To study this situation the model has been calibrated by using the observed cropping decisions from 
2000 to 2005 under the Agenda 2000 PAC policy framework. The basic results are represented in 
Table 2 showing expected profit and risk aversion as the relevant attributes of farmers’ preferences 
allowing to reproduce observed farmers’ decisions with an error of 1,8% in predicting the crop profile 
and 1.4% percent in predicting expected margin and its standard deviation. 
 
 
Table 2: The Sahagun Irrigation District: Calibration Parameters 
1  Expected Profit   0.12 
2  Risk Aversion  0.88 
ef  Distance to the Efficiency Frontier  2.73% 
ea  Crop Profile Calibration Error  1.82% 
ed  Profit and Risk Calibration Error  1.41% 
 
3.1. Efficiency Gains from Improving Water Irrigation Systems: 
 
Apart from water tariffs  as both price recovery and incentive instruments to reduce water use in 
agriculture, most of the gains are expected to come from a set of measures designed to reduce water 
extractions required to obtain any given production level. These measures imply a higher efficiency in 
extracting water, transporting it to irrigation districts, delivering it to farmers and applying it to crops. 
We reduce our analysis to enhancing irrigation efficiency by an improved water application technique 
resulting from the setting of a more effective irrigation infrastructure. As said in the introduction, the 
effect of such technical advances depends on whether water costs are relevant for farmers’ decisions 
and then water demand changes with the reduction of the marginal cost of effective water. 
 
The overall change in water demand resulting from a water efficiency improvement is the result of two 
opposite effects. The first one is a quantity effect associated with a lower water requirement to obtain a 
certain production level, the second is a price effect associated with the higher water productivity and, 
equivalently, with the lower marginal cost of the water effectively used by crops. The joint effect will 
crucially depend on whether water demands are responsive to price increases (or to water marginal 
costs reductions). Simulation results allow us to evaluate the effect of water efficiency improvements 
under different agricultural policy scenarios as shown in Figure 3. As can be observed in the case of 
the  Sahagun  Irrigation  District  under  the  current  agricultural  policy  scenario  where  subsidies  are 
partially decoupled from production and most of land use restrictions are still applied, the effect of a 
higher irrigation efficiency is different depending on water price elasticity.  
 
At low water prices, water demand is determined both by institutional constraints and water location 
rents and water demand is inelastic. Farmers do no reduce water demand as far as its use is still a 
profitable way to obtain the production linked subsidies and market rents. The percentage of water 
saved is easily calculated by considering the difference between irrigation efficiency before and after 
the technical improvement
13. In this case we have a pure quantity effect and w ater savings may be 





                                                 
13 This percentage of water saved with respect to the initial situation can be easily obtained as           where 
 and 1 represents irrigation efficiency before and after the technical shift. This way increasing the ratio 
between applied and effective water from 60% to 90% reduces water demand by 30%, provided there are no 





As  water  tariffs  increase  the  price  effect  becomes  the  dominant  one  and  irrigation  efficiency 
improvements are more likely to increase water demand. Higher prices in this case play a particular 
role in capturing the rents obtained by farmers even if these rents are the result of production linked 
subsidies or of location and water access advantages. In our case with a price higher than 14 eurocents 
irrigation efficiency improvements cannot be considered effective measures to reduce water scarcity or 
to reduce the pressures over the water environment. 
 
As mentioned above, the access to water and irrigation facilities is an important factor that determines 
the financial viability of agriculture in Southern Spain, and that is why the reduction of incentives to 
cultivate, as implied by the CAP reform, does not lead to a reduction of the irrigated surface or by its 
substitution for rain fed agriculture. At least in the Sahagun Irrigation District, the CAP reform will 
not reduce the cultivated land or the activity of agriculture. This result might not be generalised as it 
depends  on  local  conditions,  including  soil  characteristics  and  agronomic  vocation,  production 
patterns  and  farmers’  attitudes  towards  income,  risk  and  management.  Effects  may  also  differ 
depending on the time horizon and might be different in the short term, as considered in the case 
study, and in the long term when the technologies, prices and the market environment may change.  
4.  Concluding remarks 
The successful implementation of the WFD requires decision support models able to cope with the 
complexities of farmers’ decisions that are dependent on local conditions such as soil, weather and the 
availability of irrigation facilities. These models do not only need to have sufficient detail at local 
decision scales but also to be rooted in the microeconomic principles necessary to understand the logic 
behind observed decisions.  
Water efficiency measures are only effective to reduce water demands when farmers do not adjust 
cropping decisions to the lower marginal costs resulting from higher water productivity. This can be 
the case when cropping decisions are means to obtain local rents resulting both from production linked 
subsidies and from market rents resulting from the availability of irrigation facilities and access to 
water. On the other hand, prices are effective as incentive to reduce water use provided they are high 
enough for these water rents to be less relevant in explaining crop decisions. Depending on price 
elasticity and location rents water efficiency improvements might in fact increase or decrease water 
demand. The real effect of water efficiency improvements then becomes an empirical problem. 
In order to contribute to the understanding of the trade-offs between agricultural and water policy, on 
one side and between efficiency and policy measures on the other, we present a multi attribute utility 
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Effect of Irrigation Efficiency  In the Partial 
Decoupling Scenario
1 0.7 0.65580865612 
 
models currently used to prospect for agriculture and water policy we present a model that offers an 
effective calibration procedure without the cost of assuming linear and cardinal farmers´ preferences 
and  that  allows to represent  the farmers’  efficiency  frontier. This  model  based  on  multi attribute 
preferences also allows us to distinguish between the marginal productivity of the water effectively 
used by crops and the underlying demand for water to be applied in the plot. This distinction is crucial 
to understand the effect of efficiency improvements over water demand. 
The  challenge  of  implementing  the  European  WFD  in  many  respects  depends  on  the  ability  to 
coordinate the many economic activities using water as an input in such a way that economic growth 
is  compatible  with  the  effective  protection  and  the  improvement  of  water  ecosystems.  Given  the 
importance of agriculture as the main water user in many European countries, we hope the ideas 
presented in this paper can help to understand the complexities of the task and contribute to the design 
of effective river basin management plans as required by the new water policy in the EU.  
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Source: Ministry of the Environment (2007) Database MODERE for the Analysis of Water use in the Spanish Agriculture and the Art 5 Report of the WFD. 
 
Wheat barley Oatmeal Rye Maize  beans Chickpea Peas Veza Potato Sugar Beef Flax Sunflower Soya Bean
Average price (1995-2005) 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.15 1.52 0.77 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.21
Average Yield (kg) 5477.63 4827.63 3434.38 2012.25 9178.13 2191.75 2210.88 1726.75 1543.63 37954.99 69435.43 1600.00 2275.00 2100.00
Seeds and Inp. Cost €/Kg 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.62 0.07 0.17
Other Variable Cost €/Ha) 151.98 147.24 209.82 94.51 112.46 170.20 564.88 195.75 229.64 292.77 220.68 1274.65 187.56 149.40
Hired wage Cost 26.98 30.12 24.87 17.00 51.33 66.16 48.37 27.98 13.81 612.76 119.32 5.15 30.10 73.29
Family labour units 102.12 99.71 66.78 52.87 187.51 264.10 172.61 64.55 55.49 771.43 432.70 26.67 82.80 0.00
Ground water Cost €/m
3
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Reused water cost €/m
3
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Expected Variable profit (€) 378.63 229.08 -80.48 26.01 805.24 2723.51 266.28 -162.25 -85.68 4293.49 2646.29 -2336.60 72.47 -110.65
Water Application Cost 35.00 28.75 25.62 18.85 85.16 26.70 40.31 38.37 69.32 84.42 88.39 66.02 64.21 0.00
Effective Water 2490.69 2045.50 1822.90 1341.37 6059.41 1899.95 2868.32 2730.46 4932.07 6006.49 6288.95 4697.83 4568.53 0.00
Applied Water 1633.42 1341.45 1195.47 879.68 3973.81 1246.00 1881.07 1790.66 3234.49 3939.11 4124.35 3080.88 2996.08 0.00
Land Surface (Hs) 1901.00 1356.00 1824.00 20.00 908.00 11.00 7.00 881.00 73.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 66.00 0.00
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